



Metis

Study

The future of global democratic alliances

No. 46 | December 2025

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Summary

Democracies are falling behind globally. They are losing political influence, lagging behind economically and being threatened by anti-theftal systems. Even established democracies are experiencing endogenous erosion, politicisation of the judiciary, concentration of power in the executive

branch and increasing social polarisation. Under these conditions, democracies will only remain viable if they become more resilient internally and maintain their political, economic and strategic capacity to act externally through stable and global democratic alliances.

A look ahead to 2035

This study addresses the question of under what conditions a global democratic alliance can develop in the future. To this end, scenarios for the period up to 2035 are developed. The system level is chosen as the level of analysis. The central focus of interest is the identification of plausible future scenarios.

Following an introductory historical assessment, various hypothetical scenarios with alternative futures are presented using the exploratory-narrative intuitive logic scenario approach. The scenario process consists of six steps. First, the decision question, time horizon and level of analysis are defined and relevant problem areas are identified. Based on this, factors are derived from the problem areas. These factors are then rated on a scale of 1 to 10 according to their influence on the focus of interest and the degree of uncertainty of their future development (Table 1). Factors with high relevance and high uncertainty are considered key factors and are assigned plausible future characteristics (Table 2), while factors with high relevance but low uncertainty open up additional scope for action. Obsolete and secondary factors are excluded. Consistent scenarios are then formed from the combinations of key factors, and inconsistent futures are discarded (Table 3). Selected scenarios are described narratively (Table 4). The final step involves interpreting the scenarios and developing options for action.

A brief history of global democratisation

Global democratisation can be understood as a long-term transformation in which authoritarian systems are gradually replaced by democratic systems with political participation, the rule of law and the separation of powers. Democratisation therefore refers not to a final state, but to a process. In modern times, the American and French Revolutions were the first to establish republican orders with representative institutions. The global spread of democratic systems can be explained with the help of Huntington's waves of democratisation. The first wave (1776 to 1935) was closely linked to industrialisation and the formation of parliamentary institutions, but largely collapsed as a result of fascism. The second wave (after 1945) arose under the influence of the defeat of totalitarian regimes, but remained geographically limited due to the systemic rivalry between East and West. It was not until the third wave (from 1970) that global momentum developed. Southern Europe, Latin America, parts of East Asia and, after 1989, Central and Eastern Europe and parts of Africa underwent profound political transformations. Decisive factors were not only internal pressure for reform, but also external incentives such as economic openness, international recognition and institutional integration.


International organisations and alliances of democratic states played a central role in this process. Institutions such as the United Nations created normative reference points, for example through election observation, human rights regimes and conditionality.



Despite internal conflicts of interest, power asymmetries and political changes of course by individual members, NATO proved to be a successful example of security cooperation between democratic states and a guarantor of collective defence and political stability within the democratic camp. In most cases, NATO membership also paved the way for the integration of states into the European Community and later the European Union through institutional links. In contrast to international alliances, the EU offered a consolidated supranational integration framework in which minimum standards of participation, the rule of law and the separation of powers became formal conditions for accession. The prospect of accession played a central steering role in this process, as democratic reforms were not only demanded as a norm, but also incentivised by concrete political and economic benefits. The European model served as a role model in Asia, Latin America and

Africa, but could not be replicated to a comparable degree due to a lack of supranational enforcement mechanisms, lower institutional homogeneity and limited willingness to relinquish national sovereignty.

Since the 2000s, stagnation has been observed. Democratic setbacks, the rise of hybrid regimes, the ineffectiveness of inter- and supranational organisations, and authoritarian learning processes relativise earlier narratives of progress. There is increasing talk of democratic backsliding (Fig. 1). As a process, democratisation is therefore proving to be reversible. The history of global democratisation thus points neither to a triumph nor a failure of democratic order. Rather, it reveals a conflictual, path-dependent process of transformation whose success stems not only from normative appeal, but also from political assertiveness, economic prosperity, institutional stability and credible international integration.



Expert estimates of the extent to which citizens can elect their political leaders in free and fair elections, enjoy civil liberties, prefer democracy over other political systems, can and do participate in politics, and have a

functioning government that acts on their behalf. The index ranges from 0 to 10 (most democratic).

Fig. 1 De-democratisation since 2006; Democracy Index, 2006 and 2024 | Image source: OurWorldinData.org/democracy | CC BY; Data source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2006–2024)



Relevant problem areas and factors

The problem area of “international security” is decisive for the research question. Possible factors include transatlantic political coherence, Russia’s role as a revisionist power, and the systemic rivalry between the US and China. The problem area of “democratic integration capacity” can be used to derive the reform and action capacity of democratic

alliances, military independence and autonomy, and integration capacity. In the problem area of “domestic policy”, domestic political stability and isolationist tendencies in the US, as well as the rise of populist and anti-integrative forces in the EU, play a central role. In addition, the factors of social legitimacy of security policy costs and the impact of hybrid threats and influence are taken into account.

Problem area	Factor	Influence	Uncertainty
International security	Transatlantic political coherence	9	7
	Russia’s role as a revisionist power	6	2
	Systemic rivalry	9	8
Democratic integration capacity	Reform and action capacity of democratic alliances	5	3
	Military independence	7	2
	Integration capacity	8	8
Domestic policy	US domestic political stability / isolationism	6	4
	Rise of populist / anti-integrationist forces in the EU	8	3
	Social legitimacy of security policy costs	9	8
	Impact of hybrid threats (disinformation, cyber)	7	2
International organisations	NATO’s capacity to act	6	3
	Influence of the United Nations	4	8
Economic policy	Economic resilience of the West	6	4
	Technological sovereignty (armaments, AI, energy)	7	3

Table 1 Problem areas and identified factors.¹ Key factors in beige

The problem area “international organisations” focuses on the factors of NATO’s capacity to act and the influence of the United Nations, while the problem area “economic policy” addresses the factors of the West’s economic resilience and technological sovereignty. Table 1 provides an overview of relevant problem areas and factors, as well as their

assessment in terms of their influence and degree of uncertainty. The key factors (KF) highlighted in beige in Table 1 can be derived from the assessment of the influence of each factor on the field of interest and the determination of the degree of uncertainty. Table 2 summarises these key factors with their respective positive and negative characteristics.

SF 1	Transatlantic political coherence	Strategic unity between the US and Europe (+)	Strategic disagreement between the US and Europe (-)
SF 2	Democratic integration capacity	Deepened integration (+)	Fragmentation and renationalisation (-)
SF 3	Systemic rivalry	Containment of systemic conflicts (+)	Escalation of great power rivalry (-)
SF 4	Social legitimacy of democratic and security policy costs	Acceptance (+)	Polarisation and loss of legitimacy (-)

Table 2 Characteristics of key factors (KF)

¹ For reasons of space, the documentation of the assessments of the factors has been omitted. The assessment of the key factors is presented under KF 1 to KF 4.



KF 1 — Transatlantic political coherence

The degree of political coherence between the United States and European countries has a decisive influence on the structure and resilience of transatlantic cooperation and security architecture. A strategically unified position on key economic, security and defence policy issues opens up far-reaching opportunities for deeper integration, prosperity, credible deterrence and coordinated responses to external threats. Sustained coherence also strengthens the ability of Western institutions to act against revisionist actors. Permanent divergences resulting from different perceptions of threats, domestic political priorities or strategic interests would, however, significantly limit this ability. Election cycles, social polarisation and possible shifts in the US's strategic priorities can have a significant impact on transatlantic unity. Since the stability of political majorities and common strategic objectives is only predictable to a limited extent, this factor is highly relevant but also highly uncertain.

KF 2 — Democratic integration capacity

Democratic integration capacity largely determines the extent to which democratic states are able to form globally resilient cooperation and alliance structures. A high level of integration capacity makes it possible to harmonise democratic norms, decision-making procedures and institutional standards, thereby laying the foundation for deeper multi-lateral cooperation on security, economic and technological issues. It facilitates the formation of stable democratic alliances that go beyond traditional alliances and are based on common rules, reliability and mutual solidarity. Low integration capacity, on the other hand, favours fragmented cooperation formats, competing national interests and ad hoc alliances that have only limited strategic impact. Differing degrees of democratic maturity, domestic political polarisation and diverging perceptions of threats act as inhibiting factors. Since the willingness of democratic societies and governments to contribute sovereignty in favour of collective action is highly context- and crisis-dependent, this factor is both highly relevant and highly uncertain.

KF 3 — Systemic rivalry

The development of the global security situation shapes the strategic scope for action of democratic states and forms the overarching framework for global democratic security architectures. Containing systemic conflicts and limiting military escalations between major powers would create stable conditions for cooperation, deterrence and institutional consolidation. However, an intensification of geopolitical rivalries, especially between superpowers, increases the risk of parallel crises, ties up resources and weakens the ability to take coordinated action. Regional conflicts, hybrid threats and arms dynamics can act as drivers of escalation and put pressure on existing structures of order. Since interactions between regional conflicts, great power politics

and technological developments are only predictable to a limited extent, systemic rivalry is both highly relevant and highly uncertain.

KF 4 — Social legitimacy of democratic and security policy costs

Social acceptance of democratic and security policy costs is a key prerequisite for the long-term capacity of democratic states to act. Broad legitimacy for higher defence spending, economic burdens or political risks enables sustainable security and defence strategies and reliable international commitments. Declining acceptance as a result of social tensions, economic crises or political polarisation, on the other hand, can significantly restrict domestic policy leeway and lead to changes of course. Disinformation campaigns and the perception of unequal burden sharing are decisive influencing factors in this context. Since social sentiment is volatile and highly crisis-dependent, the future development of this factor is highly relevant but also subject to a high degree of uncertainty.

Consistency check, scenario development and selection

Up to 16 scenarios can be derived on the basis of the selected key factors. Table 3 provides an overview of possible combinations of key factors and their characteristics.

Of the 16 theoretically possible combinations, 13 scenarios are consistent and 3 are inconsistent and must be discarded. The inconsistent scenarios reveal irreconcilable contradictions between structural conditions (KF 1 to KF 3) and social sustainability (KF 4) and are therefore not suitable for plausible narrative elaboration. For example, high social legitimacy and positive development of systemic rivalry despite a lack of transatlantic cohesion and negative democratic integration capacity is contradictory (scenario 4). Three consistent, hypothetical scenarios (scenario 1 as the best case, scenario 10 as the most likely and scenario 16 as the worst case) are presented below. Table 4 breaks down the selected scenarios according to key factors and factor characteristics.

Scenario 1 — Best case — Global democratic security alliance

In the best-case scenario, sustained geopolitical pressure on the rules-based order leads to a profound political and institutional consolidation of transatlantic relations. The US and the EU develop a permanently unified strategic position on key issues of security, economic and regulatory policy. Diverging national interests, such as those that came to light under the Trump administration or within the EU, increasingly take a back seat to a common strategic vision based on the preservation of shared values, the rule of law, collective deterrence, economic resilience and technological sovereignty. This political coherence is accompanied by gradual economic integration.



	SF 2 (+)	SF 2 (-)	SF 2 (+)	SF 2 (-)	SF 2 (+)	SF 2 (-)	SF 2 (+)	SF 2 (-)
SF 1 (+)	(1) +++++	(3) +++++	(5) +++++	(7) +++++	(9) +++++	(11) +++++	(13) +++++	(15) +++++
SF 1 (-)	(2) -++++	(4) -++++	(6) -++++	(8) -++++	(10) -++++	(12) -++++	(14) -++++	(16) -++++
	SF 3 (+)		SF 3 (-)		SF 3 (+)		SF 3 (-)	
	SF 4 (+)				SF 4 (-)			

Table 3 Scenario matrix with possible key factor combinations (inconsistent scenarios in red were rejected)

	Transatlantic political coherence	Democratic integration capacity	Systemic rivalry	Social legitimacy of democratic and security policy costs
Scenario 1 Global democratic security alliance <i>Best Case</i> (+ + + +)	Strategic unity between the US and Europe	Deepened integration	Containment of systemic conflicts	Acceptance
Scenario 14 Autonomy under pressure <i>Probable Case</i> (- + - -)	Strategic disagreement between the US and Europe	Deepened integration	Escalation of great power rivalry	Polarisation and loss of legitimacy
Scenario 16 Erosion of democratic order <i>Worst Case</i> (- - - -)	Strategic disagreement between the US and Europe	Fragmentation and renationalisation	Escalation of great power rivalry	Polarisation and loss of legitimacy

Table 4 Study scenarios with key factors and characteristics

The US and the EU are establishing a common external tariff and coordinated trade rules, creating a transatlantic economic area with a high degree of protection against systemic dependencies. In the long term, this core will give rise to monetary and fiscal coordination, which will eventually lead to a common monetary union of democratic states. At the same time, global democratic integration capacity is deepening considerably. European barriers to integration are being gradually dismantled, decision-making processes streamlined and joint competences in foreign, security and defence policy expanded. This development is being extended transatlantically. Joint planning, coordination and decision-making structures are emerging that functionally correspond to a federal security and economic architecture. Democratic states are increasingly acting as an integrated group of actors with clear strategic control capabilities.

In this context, Western security alliances are undergoing a fundamental redefinition. NATO is being explicitly realigned as a democratic security alliance. Membership is no longer linked solely to military contributions, but is now bindingly linked to compliance with democratic and constitutional standards. States that fail to meet these criteria

on a permanent basis will be gradually excluded from the alliance or transferred to lower-tier cooperation formats. This political realignment increases internal coherence, reduces strategic ambiguities and strengthens the credibility of collective security guarantees. At the same time, NATO is opening up to other consolidated democracies. Brazil, India, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Uruguay join closely integrated associated structures. Enlargement is gradual and functional, based on common democratic norms, military interoperability and political reliability. NATO thus evolves from a regional alliance into a globally networked core of democratic security. Systemic challengers are contained through credible deterrence, institutionalised crisis communication and clear red lines. The global presence of a coherent democratic security alliance reduces the risk of escalation and significantly limits the strategic scope of revisionist actors. This consolidation of foreign and security policy is supported by broad social legitimacy. There is a high level of acceptance in the participating democracies for increased defence spending, economic adjustments and the partial relinquishment of national autonomy, as these costs are perceived as a necessary investment in long-term security, stability and political self-determination.



The result is an order that functionally corresponds to the United States of Europe and North America, complemented by a global network of democratic partners. Transatlantic unity, deeper democratic integration, contained systemic rivalry and social acceptance interlock and enable democratic states to shape the international order actively, coherently and permanently. This structural stability and normative clarity also foster a renaissance of global democratisation in the sense of a fourth wave of democratisation, in which further states orient themselves towards democratic forms of government, constitutional institutions and cooperative security arrangements.

This has far-reaching implications for Germany. Germany no longer acts primarily as a national actor, but as an integral part of a federalised transatlantic decision-making space. Foreign and security policy sovereignty is deliberately shared, which limits national scope for action but at the same time significantly increases strategic effectiveness. Defence spending and contributions to collective capabilities are rising permanently, but are cushioned by predictable burden sharing. Economically, Germany benefits from stable supply chains, technological protection and an expanded democratic internal space. Politically, the focus is shifting from national consensus-building to the legitimisation of supranational decisions. The central challenge is to maintain democratic control and transparency in a highly consolidated order without jeopardising social acceptance.

Scenario 14 — Probable case — Autonomy under pressure

In the probable scenario, transatlantic political coherence is permanently weakened. The US and the EU no longer pursue a consistent common strategy. Security, economic and regulatory priorities diverge, and the transatlantic alliance loses its character as the central axis of control in the democratic world. This development also weakens NATO. At the same time, global democratic integration capacity remains highly pronounced. Institutional cooperation is deepening, particularly within Europe, but also with selected like-minded democracies such as Brazil and India. Driven by the loss of transatlantic reliability, democratic states are developing global integration formats, harmonising standards and pooling capabilities in order to gain strategic autonomy.

The escalation of systemic rivalry is shaping the international system, regional conflicts are increasing and tying up resources. In this constellation, liberal democracies are coming under increasing pressure as they have to assert themselves in the consolidating strategic, economic and security bipolarity between the US and China and are forced to develop integration and autonomy strategies as a protective mechanism. At the same time, the perception of growing threats increases the willingness of political elites to share sovereignty and expand collective capacity for action. Institutional reform projects are being pushed forward that envisage an expansion of majority decisions

to include qualified majorities in key foreign, security and economic policy areas, while at the same time systematically expanding cooperation with other democratic states such as Japan and South Korea on security, technology and industrial policy issues. However, this development is largely top-down. The order has only limited legitimacy in society. Rising security policy costs, economic adjustments and the impression of political decoupling are leading to polarisation and a loss of legitimacy.

For Germany, this scenario means permanent ambivalence. Germany benefits from the ability of democratic states to remain capable of integration and cooperation even without transatlantic leadership. European and democratic structures of autonomy offer protection against marginalisation in security policy and make it possible to represent collective interests vis-à-vis revisionist actors. However, Berlin is forced to assume greater responsibility for security and defence policy without being able to rely on a dependable transatlantic leadership structure. European and global democratic integration are progressing, but are increasingly perceived as an elite project. Germany must mediate between domestic political polarisation and external pressure to act. Defence spending is rising, while public support remains volatile. In foreign policy, Germany is increasingly acting in ad hoc coalitions of democratic states, which increases flexibility but makes strategic planning more difficult. At the same time, pressure on national political systems is growing significantly. Domestically, the focus is shifting from consensus to crisis politics. Governments are acting more decisively in order to remain capable of action, which increases the risk of democratic erosion. Strategic communication is becoming a key resource for Germany. Without convincing narratives that portray supranational integration and security policy costs as necessary and fair, there is a risk of further alienation between political elites and the population. The central challenge lies in legitimising security policy necessities in domestic politics in order to prevent a creeping loss of trust in democratic institutions. If the EU and selected democratic partner states do not succeed in achieving their desired strategic autonomy in the near future, this scenario will remain merely an unstable transitional state and increase the likelihood that it will lead to further erosion and ultimately to the end of democratic structures in the medium term.

Scenario 16 — Worst case — Erosion of democratic order

In the worst-case scenario, transatlantic political coherence is largely eliminated. The US and the EU pursue divergent security, economic and regulatory strategies, while binding security commitments lose credibility and the transatlantic partnership is reduced to selective, short-term cooperation. Strategic disagreement leads to contradictory signals to external actors, paralyses NATO or even leads to its dissolution, and weakens the deterrent capability of democratic states as a whole.



At the same time, global democratic integration capacity is eroding. Within the EU, renationalisation tendencies are gaining ground, and joint decision-making mechanisms are being blocked or undermined. Global democratic cooperation formats are becoming less binding, while institutional fragmentation and competition between states are increasing. The EU remains formally in place, but is losing its strategic capacity to act and its role as a regulatory actor and role model. The escalation of systemic rivalry is encountering a fragmented, leaderless democratic world. Regional conflicts are increasing, the risks of escalation are rising, and existing crisis mechanisms are proving insufficient. Authoritarian and revisionist actors are deliberately exploiting the strategic weakness of democratic states to expand their spheres of influence and further undermine the rules-based order. International institutions are losing relevance, and power politics is increasingly replacing rule-based cooperation. Socially, this development is accompanied by a marked loss of legitimacy. Rising security and economic policy costs, social upheaval and perceived political inaction are leading to polarisation and a loss of trust in democratic institutions. External disinformation and hybrid influence on pluralistic decision-making processes are undermining democratic structures in the long term. As a result, democracies are losing their domestic political resilience, while political decision-making processes are increasingly being blocked or delegitimised. In this environment, anti-democratic parties are gaining popularity and authoritarian narratives, national isolationism and promises of simple solutions are becoming more attractive. This is leading to a decline in the number of democracies worldwide.

This has profound and structural consequences for Germany. The collapse of the transatlantic partnership and the functional incapacity of NATO and the EU to act are undermining the central pillars of Germany's security, prosperity and political model. Germany is losing the strategic embedding that has hitherto allowed it to compensate for national weaknesses through alliances, institutions and collective deterrence. In terms of security policy, Germany would be faced with the need to build up significantly more national capabilities in the short term without having the industrial, financial and social prerequisites for strategic autonomy. In terms of foreign and security policy, Germany would go from being a shaping actor to a reactive object of international power politics. Without reliable allies and with limited deterrence capabilities, its vulnerability to military pressure, hybrid attacks and political blackmail would increase. At the same time, its foreign policy influence would decline, as Germany would be unable to act as part of a coherent EU or as a reliable transatlantic partner. Ad hoc cooperation would replace lasting alliances, but would remain fragmented and strategically limited. The economic implications would be serious. As an export-oriented economy, Germany is highly dependent on open markets, stable

trade rules and reliable supply chains. The collapse of the EU and the rules-based order would lead to trade conflicts, protectionism and geopolitically motivated market closures. Investment declines, key industries come under pressure, and economic dependencies become security risks. The state's ability to secure prosperity and maintain social compensation mechanisms declines significantly. Domestically, this exacerbates the loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions. Rising costs for security, energy and economic resilience are met with declining state capacity to act. Political decision-making processes are increasingly perceived as ineffective or externally controlled. Polarisation is increasing, while populist and authoritarian actors are gaining influence by promoting national isolation and strong leadership. Democratic society is thus coming under pressure not through an abrupt upheaval, but through creeping erosion. The result is an international order characterised by fragmentation, systemic rivalry and instability. Democratic states are predominantly reactive, vulnerable in terms of security policy and susceptible to economic blackmail. The erosion of transatlantic structures, NATO and the EU does not mark an abrupt systemic breakdown, but rather a creeping process of decay, at the end of which democratic orders lose their ability to reliably guarantee security, prosperity and political participation. The end result is the structural failure of democratic order under conditions of sustained strategic overload.

Recommendations for action for Germany

The recommendations for action aim to break the negative interactions between transatlantic erosion, weak integration, security policy escalation and loss of social legitimacy. In the probable and worst-case scenarios in particular, it is important for Germany to take active measures to prevent a further slide into structural erosion of the democratic order.

Positively influence transatlantic political coherence

These measures aim to ensure transatlantic coherence as a robust minimum level of lasting cooperation and to limit the dynamics of erosion even in the face of political divergence.

- Visibly link German security policy contributions to concrete US commitments in order to stabilise the reliability of security guarantees
- Initiation of TTIP 2.0 with a focus on common standards, key industries, resilient supply chains, technology and industrial protection, and tariff reduction
- Systematically expand parliamentary and social dialogue formats with the US



- Negotiate a clear transatlantic division of labour (Africa, Europe, Indo-Pacific) to reduce strategic friction
- Consolidate scientific, civil society and industrial cooperation to ensure coherence beyond political cycles

Positively influence democratic integration capacity

The aim of these measures is to secure collective capacity for action through institutional reforms, functional deepening and the integration of like-minded democracies.

- Expand qualified majority voting in clearly defined core EU areas (foreign, security and industrial policy)
- Prioritise modular integration in core groups rather than formal unity
- Consolidate European armaments cooperation, including system leadership
- Establish European armed forces from EU battlegroups in parallel with NATO response forces
- Establish permanent European naval forces
- Expand and deepen global NATO partnerships with like-minded democracies (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Brazil and India)
- Deepen the interoperability of the German Armed Forces with democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific and Asia
- Gradually suspend membership of non-democratic states in the EU and NATO

Positively influence systemic rivalry

These measures aim to reduce the risks of escalation, lower susceptibility to coercion and prevent miscalculations, thereby curbing the dynamics of systemic rivalry and reducing the likelihood of uncontrolled confrontation.

- Systematically reduce critical dependencies (semi-conductors, batteries, rare earths, pharmaceuticals)

- Strengthen EU coherence in China and Indo-Pacific policy to avoid sending mixed signals
- Establish EU / Germany-led maritime security operations in the Indo-Pacific
- Define clear red lines (Taiwan status quo, cyber attacks, economic coercive measures)
- Establish military conflict avoidance formats with China to reduce risk
- Consistently apply investment screening, anti-coercion and export controls

Positively influence social legitimacy

These measures aim to stabilise social legitimacy as a central prerequisite for security and integration policy capacity. Through social cushioning, transparent communication of objectives and credible participation, polarisation can be limited and democratic resilience ensured even under increased external pressure.

- Provide social support for security and resilience expenditure (energy, infrastructure, labour market). Establish targeted compensation mechanisms for particularly affected regions and groups
- Strengthen state and civil society capacities to identify, investigate and counter disinformation and influence campaigns without undermining freedom of expression
- Clear, consistent communication about the goals, timeframes, costs and limits of German security policy in order to avoid unrealistic expectations and reduce polarisation
- Invest in political education to counter manipulation, disinformation and polarisation and to strengthen critical judgement and social resilience to hybrid influence operations in the long term
- Strengthen trust in the state's ability to solve problems through the timely implementation of agreed measures

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Publisher

Metis Institute
for Strategy and Foresight

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Copy editing, layout, design

Zum Staunen* | SciComm Creative Studio

Image credits

Cover:

Parthenon, Athen, Griechenland | Photo by Hans Reniers
on Unsplash

Translation

Metis, aided by DeepL

Original title

Zukunft globaler demokratischer Allianzen

ISSN-2627-0609

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